Q Fever Outbreak in Industrial Setting by van Woerden, Hugo C. et al.
An outbreak of Q fever occurred in South Wales,
United Kingdom, from July 15 through September 30,
2002. To investigate the outbreak a cohort and nested
case-control study of persons who had worked at a card-
board manufacturing plant was conducted. The cohort
included 282 employees and subcontractors, of whom 253
(90%) provided blood samples and 214 (76%) completed
questionnaires. Ninety-five cases of acute Q fever were
identified. The epidemic curve and other data suggested an
outbreak source likely occurred August 5–9, 2002.
Employees in the factory’s offices were at greatest risk for
infection (odds ratio 3.46; 95% confidence interval
1.38–9.06). The offices were undergoing renovation work
around the time of likely exposure and contained straw
board that had repeatedly been drilled. The outbreak may
have been caused by aerosolization of Coxiella burnetii
spore-like forms during drilling into contaminated straw
board.
Q
fever is an infection caused by the bacterium Coxiella
burnetii. The organism is found in most parts of the
world and is endemic in wild and domestic animals,
rodents, and arthropods, which provide a reservoir for
infection (1). Most outbreaks have been associated directly
or indirectly with farms or farm animals, but urban out-
breaks have been described (2,3). Infected animal birth
products can cause outbreaks of Q fever, and an infected
placenta can contain as many as 109 organisms per gram
(4). C. burnetii produces a spore-like form, which can sur-
vive for months or years before being inhaled and causing
infection (5,6). The infective dose can be as low as one
organism; therefore, large outbreaks can be caused by a
small source (7). A review of the literature was undertaken
by one of the authors (available from H.C. van Woerden).
This investigation identified 79 outbreaks reported in 48
articles in English language journals. An additional 44
papers in other languages were identified in a literature
review by Williams (7) and a further 40 German outbreaks
were identified in a literature review by Hellenbrand et al.
(8). The literature review suggested that most outbreaks are
associated with primary or secondary aerosols that arise
around infected animals or contaminated fomites (5,9).
Approximately 70 cases of Q fever are identified in the
United Kingdom each year as a result of routine surveil-
lance (R. Smith, pers. comm., Zoonosis Surveillance,
Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre, Wales).
However, seroprevalence studies indicate that approxi-
mately 27% of farmers and 10% of the general population
have antibodies, which suggests previous exposure to the
organism; this finding does not appear to have changed
substantially during the last 45 years (10,11). We report an
investigation of an outbreak of Q fever at the premises of
a manufacturer of cardboard packaging materials in
Newport docks, South Wales, in the summer of 2002.
Methods
Description of the Outbreak
A possible outbreak of atypical pneumonia was report-
ed to the local public health department on September 12,
2002, by a physician who reported that other employees at
the patient’s workplace had had similar symptoms. The
outbreak was verified, an outbreak control team assem-
bled, and a case definition agreed on (12). By September
15, 2002, a total 12 potential patients had been identified
and the first case confirmed as Q fever. The investigation
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and general medical practitioners in the Gwent area and
requesting that they supply blood samples from any
patients who had symptoms compatible with Q fever. 
Epidemiologic Investigation
Several hypotheses were explored. An outbreak could
have occurred in the wider community, and employees
could have been infected by contaminated straw, hay, or
compost; wild or feral animals; or domestic animals, par-
ticularly pregnant or newborn animals. Contamination
could have been through sources brought into the factory,
which included the following: contaminated personal
belongings; contact with a contaminated source on the
docks, which were on the way to work; windborne spread
from infected animals on nearby farms; windborne spread
from goods passing through the docks; animals or animal-
based feed; contaminated hay, straw, or farm vehicles;
sources in the factory premises; wooden delivery pallets
contaminated with chicken carcasses returned to the facto-
ry; infection passed by red mites biting infected seagulls
nesting on the roof, which then may have bitten staff in the
factory; airborne spread from a cat that had given birth
near the factory 2 years previously; airborne spread of con-
taminated dust generated by the renovation work; dust pre-
viously contaminated by an infected animal, bird, rodent,
or bat; or contaminated straw or straw board aerosolized
during drilling or removal. 
We obtained data from a variety of sources, including a
questionnaire survey, laboratories, clinicians, and factory
management. Alist containing details of the workforce and
possible, past, and confirmed cases was developed and used
to construct an epidemic curve. Data on place of work pro-
vided by factory management were used to calculate attack
rates. Details were also collected on persons who had been
on site for a limited number of days to help pinpoint the
onset of the outbreak. Employees working on the factory
floor were examined to determine whether a pattern
occurred in the infected patients by calculating the relative
risks for employees at each machine on the factory floor.
Two clinics were held at the factory on September 23
and 30, 2002, where blood samples were obtained from
and questionnaires were completed by employees and sub-
contractors who had worked at the factory at any time from
July 15, 2002, through September 30, 2002. Data from the
questionnaires were analyzed by using a nested case-con-
trol design, where cases were defined as confirmed cases
and controls were defined as noncases. The questionnaire
explored risk factors in three categories: possible exposure
in the community, in the docks or on the route to work, and
at work.
Case definitions were applied to employees and sub-
contractors who had worked at the factory at any time from
July 15, 2002, through September 30, 2002. A confirmed
case was defined as phase 2 immunoglobulin (Ig) M >320
or fourfold rise in complement fixation tests (CFT) titer or
IgM 20–160 + phase 2 IgG ≥320. A past exposure was
defined as phase 2 IgG but no phase 2 IgM. A noncase
(control) was defined as a CFT of <8 + negative phase 2
IgM and IgG + either no symptoms or onset of symptoms
>7 days before blood sample or (in which the onset of
symptoms was within 7 days of first sample) two consec-
utive blood samples with a CFTof <8 + one negative phase
2 IgM and IgG. A possible case was defined as all remain-
ing cases.
Data were analyzed with EpiInfo (v. 6.04, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA), Excel 97
(Microsoft, Redmond, WA), and Stata (v. 7, Stata
Corporation, College Station, TX) software. Possible cases
in patients and persons with evidence of past exposure
were excluded from the nested case-control study. The
analysis also excluded responses of “not sure” from odds
ratio (OR) calculations. We calculated Mantel-Haenszel
OR with exact 95% confidence limits (CI) (13). 
Microbiologic Investigation
Complement fixation tests for phase 1 and phase 2 anti-
bodies were performed at the Public Health Laboratory
Service, Cardiff. IgM and IgG immunofluorescent assays
were carried out on the samples by the Centre for Applied
Microbiological Research (CAMR), Porton Down, UK.
Laboratory staff monitored all requests for Q fever sero-
logic testing from general practitioners and hospital clini-
cians to identify any additional cases that might be linked
with the outbreak.
Environmental Investigation
Environmental information on the factory was gathered
by environmental health officers and other members of the
outbreak control team during site visits on September 23,
2002, and September 30, 2002. Management representa-
tives of several other premises in or near the docks were
interviewed. 
On October 11, 2002, an environmental scientist col-
lected 17 random environmental samples of straw and dust
from inside and outside the factory premises. The samples
were sent for polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing at
CAMR.
Results
Epidemiologic Investigation
A total of 222 employees and 60 subcontractors were
working in the factory complex from July 15 through
September 30, 2002. Questionnaires were completed by
214 (75.9%) of these 282 persons. Of the 253 persons who
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Q fever, 42 possible cases, 8 cases of past exposure, and
108 noncases. Four persons refused blood tests but com-
pleted a questionnaire. Data for the nested case-control
analysis were available on 75 (78.9%) of the 95 confirmed
cases and 101 (93.5%) of the 108 noncases. The frequen-
cy and duration of symptoms are shown in Table 1 and
Figure 1. Ten participants were still ill when questioned,
and 5 did not provide a date of onset of symptoms. Five
patients (5.3%) were admitted to the hospital with pneu-
monia. Some patients experienced fatigue. However, the
clinical impression of one of the authors involved in follow
up of patients was that very few neurologic symptoms
occurred during this outbreak, compared to a previously
reported U.K. outbreak (14). Further analysis of clinical
symptoms is being prepared as a separate paper.
The epidemic curve for 49 confirmed cases where the
date of onset of symptoms was reliably known is shown in
Figure 2. A peak incidence occurs around September 1,
2002. Based on an incubation period of 5 to 40 days (1,5),
these data suggest that almost all the cases can be account-
ed for by an exposure from August 7 to 11, 2002.
Seven confirmed patients were only present in the fac-
tory on 2 or 3 days. All these persons were present in the
factory and potentially exposed to infection from August 5
through August 9, 2002.
An analysis of home postal codes of 71 participants
with Q fever who completed the questionnaire showed no
discernible pattern and indicates that our participants were
not part of a larger Q fever outbreak with a common source
in the community. Details of place of work within the fac-
tory complex were available for participants with 61 con-
firmed cases and 81 controls. No cases occurred among
persons working exclusively outside the factory floor or
office block. In addition, no cases were identified among
seven participants working in a separate design office, one
employee working exclusively in the dispatch building, or
five sales representatives who only called into the office on
an occasional basis (Table 2). The OR for having a case in
office staff compared with other staff was 3.46 (95% CI
1.38–9.06). ORs for groups of staff working in all other
areas were <1 (Table 2).
The relative risks of having a case of Q fever among the
cohort of employees working at different machines on the
factory floor are shown in Figure 3. The balcony in Figure
3 is not drawn to scale. It overhangs the adjacent machines
where the relative risk to workers was zero. The relative
risk for infection was greatest among people who worked
in the center of the factory floor outside the shadow of the
overhanging balcony; the risk for infection dropped
towards the sides of the building.
Eighty-three percent of confirmed cases were in men, a
similar male-to-female ratio to that of the cohort as a
whole, and median age was 44 years (range 22–60 years).
Questionnaire data indicated that infected employees did
not own animals that had given birth or had a miscarriage
nor had these employees had any contact with the birth
products of animals. One subcontractor, who cleaned win-
dows at the factory, also worked on a farm and had been in
contact with animals that had given birth, but the evidence
did not suggest that any of these had been infected with C.
burnetii. Additionally, the serologic tests for this employee
were negative for Q fever, and the dates on which he visit-
ed the factory suggest that his clothing or possessions
could not have been the source of the outbreak.
Case-patients were much more likely than controls (OR
5.86; 95% CI 0.55 to 291.88) to recall coming across a hay
lorry entering or leaving the docks while on their way to or
from work. Adjusting for cases in those whose office was
refurbished reduced the OR in those who saw a hay lorry
(OR 3.00; 95% CI 0.28–31.80). Employees whose offices
had been refurbished were at greatest risk for infection
(OR 2.60; 95% CI 0.77–9.57). Employees who described
themselves as “never near an external door or window”
were more likely to be infected than those who worked
“near an external door or window on most days” (OR 1.98;
95%CI 0.72–5.56). Living on a farm appeared slightly pro-
tective (OR 0.35; 95% CI 0.01–4.53) as did the regular
handling of compost (OR 0.14; 95% CI 0.00–1.03).
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Figure 1. Duration of illness in symptomatic Q fever patients,
Newport, Wales, August–September 2002.
Table 1. Frequency of symptoms in 55 symptomatic patients with 
confirmed cases of Q fever, Newport, Wales, August–September 
2002 
Symptom  Yes (%)  Not sure 
Fever  41 (75)  1 
Sweats  53 (96)  0 
Headache  51 (93)  1 
Weight loss  26 (47)  2 
Cough  24 (44)  0 
Shortness of breath  25 (45)  2 
Joint pain  44 (80)  3 
Chest pain  20 (36)  5 
Jaundice  4 (7)
a  5 
aThese responses represent a misunderstanding of the term jaundice, 
since none of these persons had clinical jaundice. However, none of these findings, or those in Table 3,
reached statistical significance value of 5%.
The work undertaken by the seven participants with the
shortest incubation times was examined for unusual char-
acteristics. A higher proportion of those with a short incu-
bation time were women (three of seven) when compared
with the general population. Four of the seven participants
worked in offices that had been refurbished, and the
remaining three worked on the factory floor. Their dura-
tion of illness varied from 4 to 14 days.
Microbiologic Investigation
Two hundred and fifty-three participants (89.7%) pro-
vided blood samples. Some participants had only one sam-
ple taken and others had up to four additional samples
taken from September through December 2002 at primary
care or hospital clinics. Asummary of CFTand IgM results
is shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
As a result of informing general practitioners in the area
of the outbreak, more than twice the normal numbers of
general practitioner requests for Q fever serologic testing
were received. Hospital samples submitted for Q fever
serologic testing were also monitored. Our monitoring
identified one patient with a chronic case of Q fever and
one patient with an acute, neither were associated with this
outbreak. No C. burnetii was identified by PCR testing the
straw board and dust samples that were obtained from the
factory. 
Environmental Investigation
The factory consists of several buildings. The main pro-
duction area consists of a large, rectangular open-plan
hanger with an elevated office block at one end of the rec-
tangle (Figure 3). The office block was undergoing exten-
sive renovation work at the time of the outbreak. This
involved drilling >100 holes in the straw board ceiling to
allow the attachment of a new suspended ceiling. Some
internal walls made of straw board were also removed. A
temporary corridor was created from plastic sheeting
which ran through the area being renovated but did not
form a complete seal. No respiratory protection was used
by the contractors or the workforce at any stage. The cor-
ridor was in constant use by staff in adjacent offices.
Office staff and factory floor workers who visited the
offices consequently had some exposure to dust generated
by the renovation work.
The layout of the factory is consistent with the possibil-
ity of disseminating contaminated dust from the renovated
offices to the factory floor. The office block ran along the
length of one end of the factory floor. Double-swing doors
led from the second floor renovated offices onto an over-
hanging internal balcony 30 feet above the large open-plan
factory floor (Figure 3). The factory production area had
no windows and no air-conditioning system. Adust extrac-
tion system existed around some of the machines on the
factory floor to collect waste cardboard. The lack of win-
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Figure 2. Epidemic curve for 49 confirmed cases in Q fever out-
break, Newport, Wales, August–September 2002.
Table 2. Attack rates and odds ratios (OR) for different areas of work at factory implicated in Q fever outbreak, Newport, Wales, 
August–September 2002 
No. of persons working in area   No. of persons working elsewhere  
Category  Cases  Controls  Attack rate (%)   Cases  Controls  Attack rate (%)   OR (95% CI)
a 
Production/factory floor   35  52  40.2  26  29  47.3  0.78 (0.36–1.57) 
Dispatch  0  1  0  61  80  43.3  0 (0–71.79) 
Dispatch/factory floor   4  4  50.0  57  77  42.5  0.68 (0.14–2.68) 
Office  20  10  66.7  41  71  36.6  3.46 (1.38–9.06) 
Production-based but 
sometimes in the office  
1  2  33.3  60  79  43.2  0.66 (0.01–12.96) 
Design  0  7  0  61  74  45.2  0 (0–0.88) 
Sales representatives   0  5  0  61  76  44.5  0 (0–1.42) 
Dispatch but sometimes 
in the office 
1  0  100  60  81  42.6  Undefined 
Total  61  81  43.0         
aCI, confidence interval.   dows in the factory production area and the dust extraction
system almost certainly caused a degree of negative pres-
sure in the factory. This condition would draw air in
through the double doors leading from the renovated office
area and onto the factory floor. 
Discussion
Environmental and epidemiologic evidence suggests
that this outbreak was associated with the renovation of an
office block within a cardboard manufacturing plant. One
potential source identified was straw board in walls and
ceilings disturbed by the renovation work. If straw board
had been contaminated at some time in the past with a con-
centrated source of C. burnetii, drilling into this could have
produced a cloud of dust containing large numbers of C.
burnetii sporelike forms. Dust containing C. burnetii spore-
like forms could have been sucked through the balcony
doors from the renovated offices, fallen onto the workforce
below, and inhaled by those infected. Workers could also
have been infected when visiting the personnel or accounts
offices situated adjacent to the renovation work.
No record of visits to these departments exists, which
would allow this hypothesis to be further assessed.
However, the hypothesis is supported by a number of fac-
tors. The pattern of relative risk for infection in groups of
participants at different machines on the factory floor is
consistent with this hypothesis. The highest relative risks
are in the center of the factory close to the balcony, while
the lowest risks are in the areas at the sides and far end of
the factory floor. The overhanging balcony may have shel-
tered employees at some of the machines from any contam-
inated dust falling from above. Raised ORs for infection in
employees who were decanted into neighboring offices
because their offices were being renovated, and in office
staff whose offices had been refurbished, also implicate the
renovation work as the source of the outbreak.
The timing of the installation of the new suspended
ceiling (July 17–August 9, 2002) is consistent with an out-
break source near August 5 through August 9. The raised
OR in persons rarely near an open window or door com-
pared with those often near an open window or door and
the lack of cases among those who worked in the separate
design office, or among sales representatives, suggest that
the source of the outbreak was inside the factory.
The respirable dust fraction that is most pathogenic is
generally invisible to the naked eye (15,16). We do not
have a good proxy for exposure in this outbreak, and con-
sequently the issue of a dose response has not been
addressed. Exact place of work probably did not closely
correlate with exposure as many staff members move
around the building as part of their work.
Potential Contamination of the Straw Board
Straw board could have been contaminated either
before or after manufacture. Investigating the process used
to make the straw board indicated that the low pressures
and temperatures involved would not kill any fungal
spores present in the straw. If straw board becomes wet,
these fungal spores often sprout and damage the board.
The straw used to produce the board was stored in large
Dutch barns and would have been accessible to rodents,
cats, and other animals. Some evidence exists that a num-
ber of cases of Q fever were occurring around 1950 in the
English county where the straw board was manufactured
(17) and that the straw board was probably manufactured
from 1950 to 1953. C. burnetii sporelike forms are
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Figure 3. Relative risks for employees at various machines on the
factory floor in Q fever outbreak, Newport, Wales,
August–September 2002.
Table 3. Odds ratios (OR) for different risk factors in Q fever outbreak, Newport, Wales, August–September 2002 
No. of persons exposed 
 to risk factor 
No. of persons not exposed  
to risk factor 
Exposure at work  Cases  Controls  Cases  Controls  OR (95% CI) 
Office refurbished  24  23  6  15  2.61 (0.77–9.57) 
Never near an external door or window/near a 
window or door most days 
13  10  40  61  1.98 (0.72–5.56) 
Smoker/never smoked  15  35  42  48  0.49 (0.22–1.08) 
Saw hay lorry on the docks  4  1  56  82  5.86 (0.55–291.88) 
Live on a farm  1  3  72  76  0.35 (0.01–4.53) 
Regularly handle compost  1  9  68  83  0.14 (0.00–1.03) 
Contact with animal births or miscarriages  0  6  39  54  0.00 (0–1.26) 
aCI, confidence interval. resilient. They can withstand pressures of up to 20,000
lb/in2, elevated temperatures, desiccation, osmotic shock,
UV light, and chemical disinfectants (18). However,
experimental studies of the survival of C. burnetii spore-
like forms have not demonstrated survival beyond 8 years
(Table 6) (5,6). Whether experiments for longer durations
were undertaken is not clear from the source documents.
Although not directly comparable, Bacillus anthracis and
Clostridium tetani spores are known to survive for many
years. For example, B. anthracis spores have been record-
ed as surviving for 71 years on dried silk threads (19).
Alternatively, the straw board could have been contam-
inated after manufacture by the feces, urine, birth products,
or a corpse of an infected rodent that gained access to the
inner layer of a straw board. Some holes were drilled in the
straw board ceiling in 1982 and 1983, which could have
provided a point of entry. Rodents are considered an
important potential source of C. burnetii, and in one U.K.
serosurvey, 34% of wild brown rats (Rattus norvegicus)
had antibodies suggesting previous exposure to C. burnetii
(20). The placentas of common rodents can also contain
large numbers of C. burnetii sporelike forms (21) and
could contaminate straw.
Test results of environmental samples in this outbreak
were, however, negative. This finding could have occurred
for a number of potential reasons. The samples were col-
lected by persons who did not have detailed knowledge of
the outbreak investigation, and the samples tested were
minute in comparison to the quantity of straw disrupted
during the renovation work. Concentration of potential
bacterial contaminants was attempted in the PCR tests, but
analysis was performed on small aliquots of extract, and
bacterial DNA could therefore easily have been missed.
The PCR test used was also experimental, although the
protocol followed was similar to that used in Australia,
France, and Germany. A delay of 2 months occurred
between the dates when employees were probably exposed
to C. burnetii and when environmental dust samples were
collected. Consequently, contaminated dust may have been
dispersed or cleaned up in the interim. In previous out-
break investigations, test results of environmental air or
straw samples for C. burnetii have also more often been
negative (15,22–23) than positive (4,24). The environmen-
tal sampling was, therefore, like looking for a “needle in a
haystack.”
Other Hypotheses
We considered a range of alternative hypotheses but did
not find any evidence to support them. For example, wind
speeds were recorded routinely by the harbor authority but
were very low during the week of August 5 through August
9, 2002, which makes windborne spread from the nearest
farmland, 1 1/2 to 3 miles away, unlikely. No other poten-
tial wild or domestic animal sources were identified.
Animals or animal products had not been moved through
the docks in recent years. A feral cat had given birth in an
adjacent building 1–2 years previously. One of the kittens
had been adopted by an employee. However, the em-
ployee’s serologic testing for Q fever was negative. If the
feral cat had been infected with Q fever, the employee
would most likely have had evidence of past exposure to
C. burnetii. In addition, the factory strongly emphasizes
controlling vermin as some of their cardboard packaging is
used as secondary packaging in the food industry. No cats
or other animals had been identified in or around the build-
ing for several years preceding the outbreak.
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Table 4. Summary of highest phase 2 CFT results recorded for each person in the cohort in Q fever outbreak, Newport, Wales, 
August–September 2002
a 
Highest CFT  AQF cases  Noncases  Past exposure  Possible cases 
<8  4  104  5  35 
8  4  2  3  2 
16  12  1  0  2 
32  14  1  0  2 
64  16  0  0  1 
128  21  0  0  0 
256  17  0  0  0 
512  5  0  0  0 
1,024  2  0  0  0 
Totals (253)  95  108  8  42 
aCFT, complement fixation test; AQF, acute Q fever. 
Table 5. Summary of highest phase 2 IgM results recorded for 
107 persons in the cohort
a 
IgM P2 values  AQF cases 
Past  
exposure 
Uncertain 
status 
0  1  8   
Low levels  0  0  1 
80  0  0  2 
<60  0  0  0 
160  5  0  2 
320  3  0  0 
640  16  0  0 
1,280  4  0  0 
>1,280  65  0  0 
Total  94  8  5 
aIg, immunoglobulin; AQF, acute Q fever. Contaminated fomites can produce secondary aerosols
of C. burnetii sporelike forms (4), and several outbreaks
have demonstrated the possibility of spread on fomites
such as clothing, straw, hay, contaminated shoes, and
building materials (22,25–36). However, unless a mecha-
nism exists to repeatedly reaerosolize the source, fomites
are likely to pose a risk even when they are not heavily
contaminated, and this view is supported by the general
principles that govern the dispersion and settling out of
dust particles or sporelike forms (17,37).
Neither straw nor building material is a common source
of outbreaks of Q fever. However, straw has been suggest-
ed as a possible source in several outbreaks (15,27,38,39).
Two case reports implicate straw: a physician who con-
tracted Q fever after clearing out straw and rubble from his
new moorland home (26) and a businessman who was
cleaning out a barn that had been used for keeping live-
stock 10 years previously but had not been properly
cleaned since (24). Moldy hay from this barn, cultured
using cell growth medium, grew C. burnetii. The renova-
tion of buildings has also been suggested as a source of Q
fever in two previous outbreaks (26,39). The widespread
dispersal of spores in a building has been demonstrated
both by Q fever (disseminated through a large medical
school building) (23) and by anthrax (dispersed through a
post office with an area of 281,387 ft2 and a volume of
approximately 7 million ft3) (40). 
One other alternate hypothesis is that the source of the
outbreak was outside the factory building. Five persons
mentioned having seen a hay lorry in the docks. This
hypothesis was pursued because straw from farm vehicles
had been implicated as a potential cause in a previous local
outbreak of Q fever (2). However, the route taken by the
lorries was never closer than half a mile to the factory. The
lorries passed much closer to several other factories and to
residential areas where several thousand persons would
have had much greater exposure than the workforce at the
factory. Although two Q fever cases were identified in the
neighboring factory, no evidence existed of a wider out-
break involving other premises in the docks or nearby res-
idential areas. The hypothesis that hay lorries passing
through the docks could have caused the outbreak was
known to a number of employees before they completed
the questionnaire, and this finding may therefore be a
result of diagnostic suspicion bias (41). 
Control Measures
Risk assessment and risk management was undertaken
by identifying groups of persons at different levels of risk
and providing relevant advice, temporarily stopping work
in the area of the building considered at greatest risk, and
following identified patients with Q fever. The cardboard
manufactured by the factory was produced at temperatures
that made survival of C. burnetii sporelike forms impossi-
ble so customers were not considered to be at increased
risk. Unlike the straw board, which was produced a very
low temperatures, the cardboard is produced at tempera-
tures that would make survival of C. burnetii sporelike
forms impossible. In addition, the cardboard was only used
for secondary packaging and was therefore not in direct
contact with any food products.
Implications of the Study
Inhaled organic particles are an important source of a
number of occupational diseases (17,42), and risks from
exposure to occupational dust have been addressed by the
U.K. Health and Safety Executive (43,44). Q fever is also
a recognized occupational disease in the United Kingdom
(45) and governed by existing legislation (46), although it
is not a notifiable disease (47). 
Straw is an increasingly popular ecologically friendly
material, and >350,000 houses have been built in the
United Kingdom with this particular type for straw board
as internal partitions. The product has also been exported
around the world. However, this outbreak is the first where
straw board was suggested as a possible source of Q fever.
Further research is needed to fully investigate straw board
in various venues as a potential vehicle in Q fever out-
breaks. Contaminated straw board represents a potential
source of Q fever and should be considered in future out-
break investigations.
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Table 6. Survival of Coxiella burnetii
a 
Environment  Temperature (°C)  Survival 
Wool  15–20  7–9 mo 
Wool  4–6  Approx. 12 mo 
Sand  15–20  4 mo 
Fresh meat  Cold storage  >1 mo 
Salt meat  Not recorded  5 mo 
Skimmed milk  Not recorded  40 mo 
Tap water  Not recorded  30 mo 
Tick feces  Room  Conclusive evidence: 586 d
Some evidence: 6 and 8 y 
Not recorded  –20  2 y 
Not recorded  –65  8 y 
aReferences 5 and 6. 
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